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*Sources*

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3 FRANCE-USSR: Despite public statements of satisfaction with the results of Brezhnev's 25-27 June stopover in Paris, the French seem disturbed by the substance of both the Pompidou-Brezhnev meetings and the earlier US-Soviet summit.

1 The Pompidou-Brezhnev talks focused on Europe, and especially on security questions affected by SALT, MBFR, and US-Soviet bilateral arrangements. Elysee sources say Pompidou was even more forceful on the French intention to stay out of MBFR than he had been last January in the USSR and that Brezhnev did not press him. French public commentary has stressed Paris' familiar determination to retain national defense options no matter what US-Soviet real-politiking may produce.

3 Brezhnev evidently attempted to dispel French suspicions of what one French newsman called a US-Soviet "Holy Alliance" potentially inimical to the interests of the lesser powers. Official French spokesmen noted the Soviet leader's assurances that "there was no discussion of third countries, nor of France," during Brezhnev's talks in Washington. They made no attempt to conceal their skepticism about these assurances and their concern over the importance of the Washington summit. Officially inspired reports in Paris indicated that France would oppose as premature any early move to agree that the final phase of CSCE would be held at the summit level, even if Pompidou were offered the chairmanship.

183 These differences notwithstanding, Pompidou described his talks with Brezhnev as "positive and constructive." He accepted an invitation to visit the Soviet Union again early next year, and progress was made on several large-scale economic deals. The public media welcomed the visit as a symbolic reaffirmation of France's "special" relationship with Moscow.

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USSR-EGYPT: The proposed merger of Egypt and Libya, scheduled for 1 September, could lead Cairo to renounce the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty of May 1971.

4 Qadhafi encouraged and applauded the Soviet  
3 expulsion from Egypt last year, and he undoubtedly  
4 would like Sadat to take this separation one step  
further. In a speech on 28 June in Cairo, the Lib-  
yan leader criticized Moscow's treatment of Egypt  
and added that the "Soviet-Egyptian treaty must be  
useful, otherwise it should be abrogated." This  
phrasing suggests that the Soviets still have a  
4 chance to redeem themselves--presumably by providing  
weapons and more solid political support--but it is  
unlikely that either Sadat or Qadhafi believes Mos-  
cow will submit to this pressure.

4 Cairo has clearly been concerned about the  
implications of improving US-Soviet relations.  
Sadat warned the Soviets in his May Day speech not  
to be deceived by US peace initiatives. Since  
Brezhnev's visit to the US, the Cairo press has

4 [argued that the era of detente demands some reorientation and broadening of the Arabs' thinking on what political course they should follow. The implication is that the Arabs must become more self-sufficient and less dependent on Moscow.

4 Renouncing the treaty would be a popular move with the Egyptian people, but this short-term benefit would not offset the damage to Egypt if the Soviets reacted by reducing their assistance. Sadat may calculate, however, that Moscow's interest in continued access to Egyptian ports and its desire to maintain good relations with the rest of the Arab world would prevent the Soviets from deliberately crippling Egypt's military capabilities. The Soviets would be bitter, but they probably would react in moderation as they did after they were expelled from Egypt.

4 The Soviet-Egyptian treaty is to remain in force for 15 years. If Cairo is determined to break the treaty, it could claim that union with Libya makes the treaty inoperable. The Egyptians might also claim that the Soviets already nullified the treaty when they agreed at the Washington summit to consult with the US in times of crisis to avoid military confrontations. Article Nine of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty forbids either party from entering into international agreements that are incompatible with the provisions of the treaty. The Egyptians could argue that the US-Soviet agreement deprives Cairo of its option to go to war with Israel, and therefore violates Moscow's promise to strengthen Egypt's ability to eliminate the consequences of Israeli "aggression," as stated in Article Eight of the treaty.



1 EGYPT: Foreign Minister Zayyat's "Palestinian initiative" has caused a furor among the fedayeen, among other Arab states, and apparently also within the Egyptian Government.

1 At the opening session of the UN Middle East debate on 6 June, Zayyat urged that the "Palestinian nation" be given the same right to exist as was accorded Israel under the 1947 UN partition of Palestine. Zayyat's intent was primarily to separate Egypt's own problems in regaining its 1967 border with Israel from the Palestinians' problems in regaining their homeland. Egypt had previously indicated its belief that such a separation would ease the way to a peace settlement.

1 Zayyat undoubtedly intended that his remarks would be couched in language clear enough to signal to Israel and to the US Egypt's desire to disengage its interests from those of the Palestinians, but vague enough not to give the impression in the Arab world that Egypt was abandoning the Palestinian cause completely. His plan misfired.

2 The fedayeen have roundly denounced the initiative as a subversion of their goal of liberating the entire territory of Palestine, including Israel. They are undoubtedly chagrined at the implicit recognition of Israel conveyed by Zayyat's reference to the 1947 partition.

3 Jordan [redacted]  
1 [redacted] is disturbed by the implication it sees in Zayyat's remarks that this area should be the site of a future independent Palestinian state. Moreover, Jordan believes that the Egyptian move signals Cairo's intent to negotiate a separate peace settlement with Israel, a move that King Husayn [redacted]

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<sup>1</sup>~~1~~ has long feared. Within the Egyptian Government, President Sadat is reported to be angry with Zayyat, probably less over what he said than over the way he said it. There are also indications of some disagreement among Egyptian officials over the substance of Zayyat's statements.

<sup>3</sup>~~3~~ H Cairo is currently busy explaining its position, attempting to make it clear among the Arabs that Egypt intended only to enunciate a policy of self-determination for the Palestinians that would allow them the right to exist within Palestine on the basis of any sort of arrangement, which they could work out themselves, whether or not this entailed a separate state. The reassurances will <sup>1</sup>~~1~~ probably not have the desired effect.

<sup>1</sup>~~1~~ In the meantime, the message that Egypt hopes to facilitate a settlement of its problem with Israel by divorcing itself from the resolution of the Palestinian problem has been lost on Israel. <sup>4</sup>~~4~~ The Israelis have registered a firm "no" to Zayyat's statements.

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North Korea: UN Secretary General Waldheim yesterday approved North Korea's application to open an observer mission at the UN. Pyongyang will now enjoy the same status in the international organization Seoul has had since 1949.

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*\*These items were prepared by CIA without consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.*


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